'X' and Camp Security



In many Allied POW camps in Europe during World War 2, the security around escape work was ultimately controlled by ‘X’. As camp intelligence matters were usually overseen by the Camp Intelligence Officer (CIO), this freed up ‘X’ for security matters which linked in to most of his main responsibilities and activities around escape preparations. 

The CIO and ‘X’ did consult on some areas of security, although in the diagram of an ideal camp escape organisation modelled on Stalag Luft 111 (see above),  their lines technically did not cross. Where no CIO existed, ‘X’ would often head camp intelligence operations along with his own core escape work. A Camp Security Officer (CSO) would then take on the dedicated role for security.

In practice, each arm of escape preparation work (e.g. tunnelling, forging documents, tailoring, making maps and compasses etc.) had its own subcommittee from which security was one spur. This would link in with the other operations, all overseen by ‘X’ or the CSO.  It was also vital that intelligence and prisoner behaviour around this was completely secure and controlled. (See previous posts on the CIO)

Any escape preparation work had to be undertaken with good early warning systems of guards/ferrets approaching - and slick shutdown procedures were vital. Prearranged safe hiding places for items in preparation for escape were essential and tunnellers needed to return to the surface quickly in the event of unscheduled Appels (roll calls).

Early warning systems were set up with a network of strategically placed lookouts (‘stooges’) covering all approaches to huts, or wherever a clandestine piece of work was being carried out. Some stooges were located inside huts where they had good views of their observation patch, but remained unseen from the outside. Those who were visible would try to blend in with the rest of the camp activity. Once a guard or ferret moved into an ‘at risk’ area a series of prearranged signals would travel back to the hut where the work was being carried out.

The ‘all clear’ system of this is shown in the film The Great Escape where a ferret checks inside a hut whilst a ‘lecture’ on bird watching is in progress. Once he has left and reached a safe distance away, a stooge taps his tobacco pipe into the palm of his hand four times, another replaces a dustbin lid and the man outside the hut knocks on the wooden wall. Forgery operations recommence.

The diagram below shows a snapshot of the real stooging system set up in huts to protect the forging operation in the camp library at Stalag Luft 111 prior to the Great Escape. All viewing angles have been covered by hidden sentries.

 

©Keith Morley

THIS BLOG claims no credit for any images posted on this site unless otherwise noted. Images on this blog are copyright to its respectful owners. If there is an image appearing on this blog that belongs to you and do not wish for it appear on this site, please message me with a link to said image and it will be promptly removed.

Sources

Personal Notes

The Great Escape – Paul Brickhill

MI9 Escape and Evasion 1939-1945 M.R.D. Foot and J.M. Langley

The Camp Intelligence Officer - Maps

Section of an ideal POW Camp organisation

Map  - Oflag V1B - 'Australian War Memorial'

 

Much has been written since the Second World War around MI9 and MIS – X concealing maps and other escape aids in innocent everyday items e.g. shaving brushes, pencil clips, monopoly games, gramophone records, playing cards etc. These were sent to prisoner of war camps in boxes and packages under the guise of various welfare and charity organisations for prisoners. (See previous posts).

 

It was a few years before this operation kicked into full swing, and whilst these aids would prove invaluable in escape attempts, the items would only help a few of the thousands of prisoners. Most maps were produced in the camp by the prisoners themselves under difficult conditions. No drawing or printing materials were available as these were strictly forbidden, so considerable levels of creativity and underhand practices had to be applied to obtain or produce them.

 

Eichstatt - Oflag V11B - 'Australian War Memorial

 

Intelligence and security were crucial in the operation. In an ideal camp organisation, the Camp Intelligence Officer would head the map operation and coordinate intelligence, whilst ‘X’ looked after security. As outlined in previous posts, in some camps ‘X’ handled intelligence in conjunction with the cogs and machinery of actual escape work (including map making), leaving security to the SO (Security Officer).

 

A camp might already have maps smuggled in via MI9/MIS- X parcels or obtained via illicit means. These could form the master copies from which the map makers worked, though they were insufficient in number and often lacking local detail.  Current intelligence on the area around the camp was vital, so it could be translated on to maps as every second counted during the initial stages of an escape.

 

Details on the surrounding area were obtained from internal and external sources.  New prisoners arriving in the camp plus those recently recaptured and returned were debriefed for snippets of intelligence about the geography and terrain, the quietest pathways away from the area, useful short cuts or seldom used routes, railways, new roads, and landmarks which might aid navigation. This information also came from prisoners who had been on working parties outside the camp or German guards and ferrets, who might unwittingly reveal something in casual conversation. Useful sources were German camp personnel who had been previously compromised by accepting bribes of luxuries such as coffee or chocolate. ‘Tame goons’ as the prisoners referred to them were often targeted. All information had to be collated and filtered through to the map makers. In a model organisation this would be via the Camp Intelligence officer (CIO).

 

Map Hanover to Kassel - Oflag 79 - 'Australian War Memorial'

 

To maximise the chances of a successful escape once outside the wire, the maps had to be produced in sufficient numbers with suitable materials. Many were hand drawn, but the ingenuity applied in order to achieve a larger production is fascinating.

 

Englishman Philip Evans was serving as a captain in the Royal Artillery when he was taken prisoner  at Tobruk in 1942. A printer by trade, he saw the possibility of making printing plates from tiles which came from a bombed out building in the camp. The detail on the map could be drawn by hand on to the plates, with ink being made from melted margarine mixed with pitch scraped from a walkway. The printing press came from floorboards, and an ink roller from a window bar covered with leather.

 

Map drawn by Philip Evans - copyright British Library Board

 

In Stalag Luft 111, Des Plunkett and his team of mapmakers had produced a portfolio of detailed maps. Some had even been configured to individual escape plans. For security reasons Plunkett’s team operated from huts at scattered locations throughout the camp, and all were subject to the same early warning system of lookouts and stooges. His general maps covered the escape routes from Czechoslovakia to Switzerland and France and through the Baltic to Sweden.

 

Because of the numbers of maps required, individual tracing map by map was too slow, so Plunkett managed to obtain some invalid jellies through a German in the hospital block in the kommandantur. He cut them up, soaked them in hot water, and squeezed them through a handkerchief, tasting the fruity solution that ran out until it was no longer sweet. The sugar had effectively been extracted from the gelatine which was still left in the handkerchief. He melted the solution, pouring it into flat trays made from old food tins. Once it was set Plunkett had a basic but effective mimeograph (stencil).

 

He used ink made from the crushed lead of indelible pencils to draw the master copy of his maps. These were supplied by suitably compromised ‘tame’ Germans who had been ‘approached.’ After pressing the drawn map on the mimeograph, Plunkett was able to print off hundreds of copies.

 

©Keith Morley

 

THIS BLOG claims no credit for any images posted on this site unless otherwise noted. Images on this blog are copyright to its respectful owners. If there is an image appearing on this blog that belongs to you and do not wish for it appear on this site, please message me with a link to said image and it will be promptly removed

 

Sources

 

The Great Escape – Paul Brickhill

Personal notes

Next week - 'X' and Camp Security


The Camp Intelligence Officer - Forgery



Forged German Identity Card  Stalag Luft 1 - Roy Kilminster



As above - Roy Kilminster

Accurate documents were essential for the prisoner of war attempting escape from a German run camp in occupied Europe. Once away from the wire, he would be unlikely to get very far without at least an identity card.

As the war evolved, POWs were kept in camps or secure permanent structures (e.g. Colditz) in Germany or Poland. The geographical location of many camps put their prisoners a long way from the borders of a neutral country; either by distance, terrain, or both.  

A good set of documents and passes had to be carried to undertake any serious travel via train or bus, or to visit certain towns and cities. A ‘back story’ within the documents carried needed to fit the escaper’s bogus identity. Identity cards and permits had to be forged to a high standard, and for this to be effective, accurate and up to date intelligence was vital. Passes and official documents were sometimes changed by the occupying powers in design and stamp. The POW forgery operation had to be mindful of this. Photographs of the holder were also often required.

 

Forged leave pass for a French worker who had been taken as a POW and forced to work in Germany - Roy Kilminster

 

 

In an ideal organisation, the Camp Intelligence Officer (CIO) would head the operation to obtain information and produce the necessary documents. Although the organisation chart above sets this apart from the work of ‘X’, it is likely that ‘X’ would have been fully aware of what was happening and be involved periodically outside his own remit. As in previous posts, ‘Security’ was a typical cross-over point.  In some camps ‘X’ incorporated the CIO role, and security was run as a separate position by another officer. In these set ups, all parties usually reported to the camp Senior Officer who had a more proactive role, rather than being just a figurehead with final ‘rubber stamp’ authority for escape work.

A good forgery operation in a POW camp required specific key components:

A team of men with artistic skills and a steady hand with pen and ink, an eye for detail and the ability to improvise with materials.

They had to be able to hand stencil to make a finished product look like a typewritten script, and also draw the background of a master document’s watermark with pen, ink brush and watercolour so that it looked authentic. Someone with photographic and developing knowledge had to be able to work with minimal materials.

Typical examples of innovation would be the carving of authorisation stamps with a razor blade out of wellington boots, shoe heels or even soap, or making up the appropriate type and colour of paper for cards/ documents by tearing out quality paper from library books provided by the Red Cross and staining them in the correct shade with cold tea. Two other examples were the ‘manufacture’ of paints and ink from lampblack diluted with oil, or the creation of a waterproof ink from a mix of glycerine, ether, oil and soot.



Forged documents were hand stencilled to look like script. The official German stamps were carved from rubber heels taken from POW shoes -  U.S. Air Force Academy

 

A location(s) where the forgery operation could take place and be shut down quickly in the event of guards or ferrets being nearby.

A well-rehearsed shut down operation with good hiding places for work in progress were mandatory. On an occasion in Stalag Luft 111, when a guard approached unexpectedly, forger Alex Cassie launched into a lecture on psychology to cover up the work which had been quickly concealed. In the Hollywood film The Great Escape, the actor Donald Pleasence, played the part of ‘The Forger’, and gave a lecture on bird watching to cover up what was going on.

An effective early warning system of signals from lookouts and stooges around the camp

A system used in Stalag Luft 111 will be covered in a later post

Obtaining paper, drawing and photographic materials and a camera by whatever means.

 ‘Borrowing’ or retaining original documents to copy usually occurred by illicit means, namely bribery or blackmail of guards and ferrets, plus occasional picking of pockets. A camera and basic photographic materials were also obtained by compromising and then leaning on carefully chosen Germans in the camp. Pens, ink and paper arrived this way too, but in one known instance a German cook in the camp kitchen at Stalag Luft 111 was genuinely convinced that drawing materials would provide a lifeline for a prisoner he had got to know, so smuggled items in.

This camera was sent into Stalag Luft III in early 1944. Although it came in covertly via MI9 it is illustrative of the type used to take photographs for identity cards and passes.  Image U.S. Air Force

The collection of up to date verbal intelligence around documentation.

This was often picked up from tame guards or ferrets, new prisoners with outside knowledge/information from a previous camp, or prisoners who had been recaptured due to a change in documentation or revision of checking strategies.

Forged documents produced at Stalag Luft III - IWM HU21214.

The range of forged documents and papers which might be required by a POW on the run to complete his identity was astounding. These could include a basic identity card, officer’s pass, forged leave papers and permits  giving permission to cross a frontier, correspondence bearing forged business letter heads and company stamp (often produced using genuine firms names taken from adverts in German newspapers) and fake personal letters from a wife or girlfriend.

On 29 October 1943 Lieutenant Richard Codner and Flight Lieutenants Eric Williams and Oliver Philpott broke out of Stalag Luft 111 via the famous Wooden Horse escape. The men’s escape plan was to make for the German port of Stettin and try to get aboard a ship from neutral Sweden.

In their IS9 files the list of false documents carried is a perfect illustration of how forgery and intelligence worked in parallel:

Flight Lieutenant Oliver Philpott

‘My story was that I was Herr Jon Jorgensen a Quisling Norwegian (did not speak a word of the language) on an exchange from Denofa (a/k Frederikstad), to the Margarine Verkauf’s Union, Berlin, and doing a tour of all branches, factories, etc. anywhere in Gross Deutschland. A very fine set of papers were provided in the camp:

 *Vorlaufige Ausweis (an original, and the first time we have used one of these.)  * Temporary Identity Card

*Two polizeiliche Erlaubnisse  (One original)  *Police permission to travel

*One Bescheinigung   *Certificate

*Arbeitskarte   * Work card

*Bestatigung (Certificate of Issue of Arbeitsbuch)   * Confirmation certificate of issue of workbook

Typed letter from Margarine Verkaufs Union introducing me.

Typed letter from the National Samling*, asking me in Norwegian to go and hear Quisling speak about the reconstruction of Europe.  *National Unity Party in Norway – fascists

Membership card of the National Samling

A very bogus Swedish sailor’s pass added for the dock part of the journey.’

Lieutenant Robert Codner

‘Vorlaufige Ausweis

Arbeitskarte  Police permission to travel, reason for travelling supplied by the firm on Reichsbauamt  (German Empire Building Authority’ – construction, maintenance and equipment)

‘Swedish seaman’s pass (highly questionable). Seaman’s pass designed solely to baffle a simple official in case we were stopped.’

Flight Lieutenant Eric Williams

‘As above plus:

A photograph of a stunning girl inscribed ‘ A mon cher Marcel – Jeanne’  Two letters written in French to myself, Marcel Levasseur.’

Sources

IS9 Files – National Archives

The Great Escape – Paul Brickhill

Personal notes

 
©Keith Morley

THIS BLOG claims no credit for any images posted on this site unless otherwise noted. Images on this blog are copyright to its respectful owners. If there is an image appearing on this blog that belongs to you and do not wish for it appear on this site, please message me with a link to said image and it will be promptly removed

Part Two - Compasses Smuggled into Camps via MI9 & MIS - X

The Allies were able to assist escape work in the POW camps of occupied Europe by sending in a range of concealed aids. British POWs were able to communicate with MI9 in London via coded letters and later the Americans operated the same way via MIS–X in New York and Fort Hunt near Washington. Compasses were a key escape item which the two organisations attempted to smuggle into camps. 
 
MI9 initially led the way in this field as they had been in the war for over three years by the time MIS –X was formed in October 1942. After some early problems with codes, and subsequent help from MI9, the Americans were able to build up their own operations quickly, as they did with producing and shipping out concealed escape aids to camps.  
 

Christopher Clayton Hutton

Clayton Hutton had been proactive for MI9 (see earlier post). He found a firm of instrument makers, Blunts in the Old Kent Rd London run by 2 elderly brothers. From 1000 feet of steel strip they made 5000 magnetised bars nearly 1inch long. This formed the basis from which various designs of compass were made.
 
Tiny brass cylinders a quarter of an inch across with a luminous compass needle balanced within them could be hidden in a pipe or fountain pen, or in the back of a service button or cap badge. Larger ones could be painted over and become the bases of collar studs. These were commonly worn by men so could filter their way into a camp without suspicion. The escaper could scrape the paint off with a finger nail when he needed to use the compass.

 
Another method was to use a lead pencil with a metal clip for carrying in the breast pocket. The clip could be made of steel, then magnetised before a small dent was punched beneath it at the point of balance so it would swing on its own pencil tip.

Razor blades were also magnetised, with the north end of the magnet at the same end as the start of the maker’s name printed on the blade. It would function well when suspended from a piece of cotton or thread.

 

 

 
It was possible for certain escape aids to be requested via a normal chatty letter home to one of the mythical ‘relatives/friends’  (MI9/MIS –X aliases) adopted by the POW coded letter writer (see previous post). The aids would then arrive at the camp concealed inside specific items which were part of a general consignment of tinned food, coffee and everyday articles  such as soap, razor blades etc. They came from one of the fictitious prisoner of war welfare organisations created by MI9 or MIS – X. (These bodies were totally separate from the International Red Cross parcels which were never compromised because of the prisoner’s total reliance upon them due to meagre German rations.) 
 
By the time the loaded parcels arrived, a typical return letter from the ‘relative/friend’ to the prisoner involved in the code writing would already have been received in camp. The correspondence would indicate once decoding had taken place, which package(s) contained the hidden contraband. BBC radio broadcasts were also occasionally used to conceal similar coded messages about items (usually The Radio Padre – see previous post).
 
The CIO would be briefed and a plan adopted to minimise the risk of any detection by German guards or censor (in some camp organisations this was done via the code writer briefing the Senior Officer, who in turn briefed ‘X’.) A tried and tested system with subtle diversionary tactics was often already in operation.
 

An early American example of this process in action occurred at Oflag 64 (American ground force officer’s camp), but what happened was typical of other Allied camps in occupied Europe at the time.

Oflag 64  - Robert Keith

 
The American parcels officer in Oflag 64 was always on hand when a consignment of mail and packages arrived for POWs. The reason given had been to prevent German pilfering. The captors were happy to accommodate this arrangement as it removed the opportunity for such allegations to be made.
 
The parcels officer was able to have a regular volunteer crew of trusted POWs to assist the Germans in unloading any railway wagons with POW mail and parcels at the nearby railway station. For the German guards, it was an opportunity away from the camp to take a rest and observe someone else doing the work (they were probably smoking American cigarettes handed over by one of the volunteer party).
 
Two POWs would unload the wagon and stack boxes and packages into the back of a lorry, while a third man with a clipboard (usually the parcels officer) appeared to be keeping a record of all deliveries. The third man was in reality looking out for specific coloured labels on the consignment. Unknown to him, these would be shipments from one or more of the fictitious POW welfare organisations run by MIS – X, e.g. ‘Servicemen’s Relief.’ He would also be keeping an eye out for packages or boxes addressed to certain named individuals. These were often the code writing POWs, or a link man involved in the subterfuge. It is important to note that although a number of POWs were involved in the operation, they would be unaware of the contents of any of the packages apart from details indicated on the routine labelling, and they had no idea that the organisations which supplied the prisoner’s parcels were false.
 
Each package was taken from the lorry and carried to the Camp Vorlager (receiving area) and placed at the end of a long table. The censor would be waiting close to the parcels officer at the opposite end.
 
In this example, requests had been made by the code writers for escape items and a radio part. A coded reply had arrived back by letter advising that packages with concealed items were en route. The parcels officer had already been solely briefed ly on what to look out for and he had alerted his team. The men had been looking for these packages for a number of weeks and they stood out from the ordinary Red Cross boxes which were smaller, wooden and strapped with metal bindings. The ‘Servicemen’s Relief’ packages were wrapped in brown paper and tied with hemp twine.
 

Typical Contents of Red Cross Parcel

As the parcels officer was there only to ensure correct handling and prevent theft, he could not touch the packages. The guards took them off the table in groups of five to line up in front of the censor. The metal bindings around the Red Cross boxes were retained by the Germans for obvious reasons, and the censor opened each box or package to inspect the contents individually. Anything soft such as soap or shoe polish had a needle inserted to check for concealed items. Once the censor was happy, he would allow a POW to stack the box or package with other cleared ones.     
 
When the delivery had been dealt with, the prisoner party was allowed to take it into camp. The team had been briefed to look out for and ‘fast track’ specific packages, so once they had been spotted at the railhead, they were suitably stacked on the lorry to enable suitable placement in the inspection order at the Vorlager. The ‘loaded’ packages were also conveniently the next ones in the pile to be taken out as the parcels officer conveniently reached his turn in assisting the other prisoners.
 
Once the recipients had received their delivery from the parcels officer, lookouts were posted to watch for any Germans or POWs. In a typical camp organisation, only the code writers and probably ‘X’ and the CIO would be present. In this example, the 2 code writers, Camp CO, ‘Big X’ and an officer k/a ‘Big S’ for security were in the hut. The coded message from MIS – ‘X’ had added ‘break all wooden objects’.
 
The contents of the parcels included tinned and dried food. Also in this consignment were a normal looking shoe brush and shaving brush. These were the only wooden items and appeared routine and not tampered with. The men decided to follow their instructions and began to attack the shaving brush. Five small compasses and a wad of German Reichmark bills fell out as it broke. The hollowed out handle of the brush also contained five tissue maps in the bottom. Everything had been packed together to stop it rattling around inside. After the handle had been hollowed out by MIS – X and the items inserted, it had been glued back to the rest of the assembly, sanded and then varnished until any signs of interference were removed. The radio ‘part’ inside the shoe brush was a requested diagram for a radio transmitter.  
 
Sources
 
The Escape Factory – Lloyd Shoemaker (Recommended read)
 
MI9 Escape and Evasion 1939-1945 - M.R.D. Foot & J. M. Langley (Recommended read on MI9)

National Archives
 

Personal notes

  
©Keith Morley
 
  
THIS BLOG claims no credit for any images posted on this site unless otherwise noted. Images on this blog are copyright to its respectful owners. If there is an image appearing on this blog that belongs to you and do not wish for it appear on this site, please message me with a link to said image and it will be promptly removed.

 

 

The Camp Intelligence Officer – Compasses Part One

From The 'Ideal Camp Organisation' Flowchart



German Officers at Stalag Luft 111 - IWM

In an ideal POW camp organisation, the Camp Intelligence Officer (CIO) or IO would have overall control and accountability for:

 
Compasses being made in the camp
 
Compasses entering the camp concealed in welfare packages from the various fictitious prisoner of war welfare organisations.* (*Next week’s post)
 

These operations would be delegated to individuals and teams who reported to the CIO. Responsibility for stooges and lookouts in the camp (who were positioned as an early warning system to protect the manufacture, receipt and hiding of items) went to ‘X’ under his remit of ‘Security’ of the escape service (see full diagram on earlier posts). No one else apart from ‘X’ and the ICO would have knowledge of the whole picture.

The CIO and/or his immediate subordinates often had a lever on certain German guards and ‘ferrets’. They were able to obtain items and intelligence useful for escape work from ‘the goons’, via blackmail, ‘persuasion’ or bribery. In Stalag Luft 111 during the run up to the Great Escape, Flight Lieutenant Arnost ‘Wally’ Valenta was in the author’s view the ICO. He was proactive in the role and far from being just a figurehead, used his expert knowledge of Czechoslovakia to accumulate and head intelligence gathering for that area. Valenta had also been able to use his influence on certain Germans within the camp tas regards obtaining materials and intelligence. E.g. luminous paint for compass needles so they could be used at night without the danger of striking matches.

 

Flight Lieutenant Arnost ‘Wally’ Valenta  - cshq-czechs.wz.cz

Manufacture of Compasses in a Camp
 
The best recorded examples of this are arguably in Stalag Luft 111 where Valenta oversaw the manufacture of compasses by Australian Flight Lieutenant Albert Hake who headed the British, Commonwealth and European Allies effort from Block 103. In effect, he let Hake get on with the job as the Australian was a master of his craft.

Flight Lieutenant Albert Hake

Captain John M Bennett led the US equivalent. He had learned his trade from Hake before the two were split up when the Americans were housed in a separate compound and Bennett went on to adopt certain variations of his own in the ‘manufacturing’ process. The details of how the two men made up the compasses are a testament to their skills in craft, ingenuity and improvisation.

Bennett’s Compasses – A Step by Step Guide
 
Heat up a section of a broken phonograph record (made from Bakelite) until soft and moulded.
 
Put the soft Bakelite over a moulded hole in a bed board about one and a quarter inches in diameter and push a section of the Bakelite into the hole to form a ‘cup’ about one and half inches deep.
 
With the ‘cup’ still in the hole, press it on to an ‘engraved’ metal disc below which has the imprinted words on it ‘made in Stalag Luft 111. (This would show on the bottom of the ‘cup’ of every compass made.)
 
Glue a bunch of old razor blades into a double line on a board in such a way that two legs of a child’s horseshoe magnet could be drawn across each line of blades simultaneously.
 
Stroke the blades in the same direction for three to four hours. At the end of that time, the blades would have been permanently magnetised.
 
Use a window hinge as a precision vice and break the blades into precisely sized magnets. 
 
From a piece of cardboard cut some compass cards of an equivalent size to the Bakelite cup and make a hole exactly in the centre. Cards will already have had the key compass points drawn on them.
 
Push some warm Bakelite through the hole of the card so as to extend out of the top of it. Create a tiny cavity in the point with a lead pencil, so that the compass card could be suspended on a phonographic needle.
 
Using broken window glass; cut a top for each compass under water with a pair of scissors, so that the glass does not chip or break.
 
Cut a short strip of cardboard to serve as a spacer for the glass to sit on,  and position.
 

Compass is complete.

 

Hake’s Compasses

Hake’s original design was similar to Bennett’s adaptation except:
 
A gramophone needle was sunk in the centre of the ‘cup’ base for the needle pivot.
 
The direction needle itself was part of a sewing needle which had been rubbed against a magnet.
 
A tiny pivot socket was soldered to the centre of the magnetised direction needle. (Solder came from the melted joints of bully-beef tins and resin for the soldering out of pine trees, and when they were cut down out of the resinous wood of the huts)
 
Artists painted the points of the compass accurately in white on a little circle of paper and it fitted neatly into the base of the casing. The ends of the needle were painted with luminous paint.
 
After the glass for the compass tops had been cut in the same way as Bennett outlined, it was fitted on to the ‘cup’ or casing by an interesting method. Hake made a small blow lamp out of a fat-lamp and some thin tubing rolled out of old food tins. Through the tube he blew a gentle jet of air against the flame playing it around the rim of the Bakelite compass ‘cup’. When it was melting soft he pressed in the glass and it set tight and waterproof.
 
Hake was able to produce one compass a day with this method.

Once the compasses were made, X assumed responsibility for hiding them along with other aids. In Stalag Luft 111, Roger Bushell directed they were hidden behind various false walls in huts and cupboards, down tunnel ‘Dick’ and outside at the earth latrines.

Both Hake and Valenta escaped from Stalag Luft 111 in The Great Escape but were tragically two of the fifty executed by the Germans.

More rudimentary compass used by Oliver Philpott who escaped from Stalag 111 via 'The Wooden Horse in Oct 43 - IWM

 

Compass with razor blade Stalag Luft 1 - Roy Kilminster

Next Week - Compasses smuggled into the camps via MI9 & MIS - X
 
Sources
 
National Archives

The Great Escape – Paul Brickhill

The Escape Factory – Lloyd Shoemaker

The Great Escapers – Tim Carroll

MI9 Escape and Evasion 1939-1945 M.R.D. Foot & J. M. Langley

Personal notes

©Keith Morley

 

THIS BLOG claims no credit for any images posted on this site unless otherwise noted. Images on this blog are copyright to its respectful owners. If there is an image appearing on this blog that belongs to you and do not wish for it appear on this site, please message me with a link to said image and it will be promptly removed.

The Camp Intelligence Officer - Part Two (Wireless Traffic From England)

The Camp Intelligence Officer (CIO) generally had a line responsibility for the receipt, control and distribution of information picked up from hidden radio receivers in POW camps in Western Europe. Some camp organisations incorporated the CIO duties into X’s role. ‘X’ would have control over radio and coded message matters, report to the Senior Officer, but still be free to manage the various other escape committees.  
 
The use of coded letters in and out of POW camps had resulted in an exchange of helpful  intelligence without discovery by the German censors. The major disadvantage was the time taken for question and answer processes to run their course. The war had often moved on in between letters, and information could become stale or of no use. Seven weeks for letters to be exchanged between Germany and England was seen as an optimistic timescale and in Italy anything from seven months upwards made MI9 and MIS–X look for better ways of communicating with prisoners.
 
POWs in Western Europe received the German version of the war, which was totally slanted and hardly a boost to morale.  The use of wireless receivers, (if they could be smuggled in to a camp or assembled from random parts) was seen as an ideal way to speed up communication and enable POWs to receive a more helpful version of how events were progressing.  



Actual wireless concealed in RAF Roy Kilminster's bunk at Stalag Luft I -  Roy Kilminster

http://www.merkki.com/photo.htm

From the beginning of the war, prisoners had always been on the look out for chances to cadge or steal wireless receivers or in most cases acquire miscellaneous parts which could be adapted to construct a simple piece of apparatus to pick up transmissions, especially the powerful BBC broadcasts. Most camps had some POWs who were wireless technicians with good skills around the workings and components. They were able to utilise and adapt the most unlikely metal items in the construction of a receiving set. Additionally MI9 and MIS–X smuggled key radio components and  the smallest receivers they could find into camps concealed in parcels from the fictitious welfare organisations for POWs. (See previous posts on escape aids and codes) This practice lessened once intelligence filtered through that most camps had hidden radios. 



Drawing of how the wireless was concealed  - Roy Kilminster

http://www.merkki.com/photo.htm

Close up of hiding place - Roy Kilminster

http://www.merkki.com/photo.htm

Screwdrivers used to tune the radio concealed behind the board - Roy Kilminster

http://www.merkki.com/photo.htm

MI9 on occasions used one of the most popular programmes on the BBC, ‘The Radio Padre’ to transmit its messages. Every Wednesday evening at 7pm, the Reverend Ronald Selby Wright delivered some religious words and thoughts which also contained information in one of MI9’s secret codes. (Usually ‘HK’- see previous post)
 
If the Reverend was told to open his talk with the words ‘Good evening forces’ instead of ‘Hello’ or just ‘Good evening’ – both he and the POWs would know that the text contained a hidden message for prisoners listening on their radios. Wright had no idea what information the hidden message contained, only that a coded message existed within. The whole broadcast was taken down in shorthand by a listener in the camp and then written out in full longhand before work commenced to decode it. 
 

Reverend Ronald Selby Wright pictured with Princess Margaret
http://www.bbc.co.uk/scotland/history/scotlandonfilm/media_clips/clip_display.shtml?topic=home_front&subtopic=homeguard&clip_name=radio_padre_code_aa&media_type=audio&popup=yes

BBC transmissions also enabled prisoners to receive more accurate news of the war. Both captor and captive were known on occasions to have displayed maps showing the latest position of the respective armies across Europe. As the war began to turn, the flags on the Allied map might have shown the enemy in a more advanced state of retreat than those positioned on their captors map. It is easy to imagine an enraged Camp Commandant stepping up searches for a hidden radio some days later, once the information on the POW map was proved to be accurate. POWs openly adopting this practice must have been confident that their wireless equipment was sufficiently well hidden to avoid discovery and viewed it as another form of ‘goon baiting.’ The reality was that in most camps, information obtained by prisoners as a result of listening in to wireless broadcasts stayed  'in house.'
 
The Camp Intelligence Officer played a vital role around wireless operation. The whole process had to be conducted in the most complete secrecy and centred in a room in one specific hut. The CIO would usually insist on all appropriate personnel living in that particular room e.g. technicians, shorthand men and the man who hid the radio. As operation of the ‘set’ was confined to one person who would take down a transcript of the broadcast, other members of the team acted as lookouts whilst the radio was in use. One person stood at the window of the room, one at the door and one stood at each of the two entries to the hut, watching the lookouts who were positioned around the camp to spot any signs of approaching German ‘ferrets’ or guards. It was common for most prisoners to be totally unaware of who was involved with actual wireless work, where the ‘set’ operated from and where it was concealed.

Fences at Stalag Luft I - Roy Kilminster
 http://www.merkki.com/photo.htm

Another key role for the CIO was the control and release to POWs of war of news received by wireless.. Good news such as Allied victories and advances were a great morale booster, but any setbacks had to be carefully handled. German victories or heavy Allied casualties could have a negative effect on camp spirits and were not always revealed or were played down. News coming into the camp via the radio would be translated from the initial shorthand and then examined by the ICO, who would liaise with the Senior Officer to finalise what information would be released to prisoners. Common practice was then for one high security man to memorise it and then pass the information on to each hut. This is where the line of the CIO and wireless operations crossed into the security of ‘X’s territory.
 
POW’s were all instructed following the receipt of good news not to show the slightest signs of a change in emotion or body language which might tip off the Germans that information about the war was being received via a wireless. Loose talk amongst POWs, and with their captors about anything beyond the wire that could not be explained was expressly forbidden.  
 
One aspect of wireless work which was not used by POWs was radios with transmitters. Some camps had managed to obtain the parts and assemble them by the same methodologies as they had for receivers, or by way of MI9/MIS-X who had sent components concealed in the usual welfare parcels. Radios with transmitters were more difficult to conceal and use effectively. The sending of any transmissions was also strictly forbidden by MI9 and MIS- X, except in emergencies and this instruction was relayed to the camps via coded messages. A hypothetical example of an emergency might have been if reliable information had been discovered that all POWs were to be imminently executed by the Germans and POWs were making ready to try and fight their way out.
 
As the invasion of Italy by the Allies loomed and the Italian fascist regime stood on the point of collapse, in June 1943 MI9 issued a disastrous coded order to all POWs through the Reverend Ronald Selby Wright’s weekly radio programme.  This was picked up in the camps and decoded and it ordered British POWs in Italy to remain in their camps after Italy surrendered. In some locations, British officers even posted their own guards to prevent the men from leaving after the Italians had laid down their weapons. As a result, the German army was able to walk into dozens of camps and round up the POWs. It is estimated that more than 50,000 Allied soldiers were transported from Italian camps by cattle train to far worse conditions in Germany and Poland during the summer of 1943. Many died, either shot while trying to escape from the trains or in the camps over the course of the following two winters. The use of hidden radios in Allied prison camps had a darker side.

Sources

 

MI9 Escape and Evasion - M.R.D. Foot & J.M. Langley

National Archives

The Escape Factory - Lloyd R. Shoemaker

 

©Keith Morley

 

THIS BLOG claims no credit for any images posted on this site unless otherwise noted. Images on this blog are copyright to its respectful owners. If there is an image appearing on this blog that belongs to you and do not wish for it appear on this site, please message me with a link to said image and it will be promptly removed.

 

 

 

 

The Camp Intelligence Officer – Part One (Letters and Codes)

 



During World War Two, many Allied POW camps in Western Europe, leaned towards operating their escape organisation with a Camp Intelligence Officer who sat directly alongside ‘X’. Stalag Luft 111 had a textbook escape organisation (see flow chart), but this should not detract from the efforts in other camps. They did not always have the same ‘advantages’ as the camp involved in the Great Escape.
 
Stalag Luft 111 (Sagan):
 
1) At its peak extended over a larger area which was more difficult for the Germans to administer, control and cover.
 
2) Expanded to contain high numbers of prisoners, who in turn generated equivalent amounts of Red Cross parcels, the contents of which were ideal for bribery and blackmail with the guards and 'ferrets'.
 

Contents of Red Cross Parcel

3) Received greater numbers of welfare packages pro rata, containing concealed escape aids etc. (See previous post Escape Aids & Codes). Red Cross parcels were never used for this kind of trafficking because of the prisoner’s total reliance on them. The risk of these being stopped by the Germans was too great. The packages containing concealed escape aids were orchestrated by MI9 and came from fake British organisations such as The Licence Victuallers Sports Association, The Prisoners Leisure Hours Fund and The Welsh Provident Society etc.  MIS-X fronted the US equivalents which were The War Prisoners Benefit Foundation and Servicemen’s Relief. Statistically because of the sheer volume, the expertly concealed escape aids stood a better chance of getting past the German censor and assistants in the camp Vorlager without discovery.
 
4) Was a camp for Allied Air Force officers, who brought with them a full range of skills and creativity which could be utilised in escape work.
 
5) Had very sandy soil below the top surface, making tunnel digging quicker, but the risk of cave-ins was higher, necessitating more reinforcement of the sides and roof, plus the need to dig down deeper than usual. The latter became a considerable advantage in avoiding detection.

 

Camp Intelligence Officer (CIO) Alongside 'X'

 

Coded letters and wireless traffic from England were the domain of the CIO. 'X' linked in to the line at 'Escape Intelligence'

 

It is easy to assume that the Camp Intelligence Officer (CIO) would be solely concerned with information gleaned from inside and outside the camp which helped escape work and planning. In practice, the CIO also oversaw the sending of intelligence information out of the camp to the Allies and any reciprocal return of messages.

 

In the early part of the war, intelligence gained from observations/ information within camps and deemed helpful to the Allies, was concealed in code via innocent letters from POWs to close family or wives. Some prisoners had worked out a system of coded communication with their wives in the event of capture, so were able to implement this. Because the ‘signposts’ used would be personal and only known to the couple, they were difficult to spot or break, provided they were well thought out and carefully utilised. These systems were known to MI9 and labelled ‘dotty codes’ because they often used a row of dots in the heading or text of the letter to show where the message began and ended. 

 

MI9 saw the potential of this medium of communication from an early stage and developed a code called HK which several POWs were using to contact London from Germany by November 1940. John Parker was one of them. He had been caught in a raid on Guernsey and having narrowly avoided being shot as a spy had already passed on his code which formed the basis for HK.

 

HK worked through a written letter home. The author would indicate by the way they set out the date on the letter whether it contained a coded message within. The opening words would conceal which part of the code would be used and then a normal chatty correspondence would contain words containing letters at certain points which could be extracted, set against the code table and deciphered. 

 

Code users were picked as a result of MI9 lectures to service personnel during training. These equated to around 1% of the army and navy, most fighter pilots and 6% of other aircrew. They were selected for their aptitude and discretion and during the short training were warned that the subject must never be mentioned in the mess or when off duty. ‘No discussion on the Code must take place between yourselves or anyone else…be on your guard at all times against talking of these matters, and, in the interests of everyone, report to this branch any breach of Security which comes to your notice.’ 

Statistically only a small percentage would be captured and have to make use of their code from behind the wire, but a plan was in place.  

The Americans did not develop their own codes, preferring to use the MI9 ones (the latter developed new versions as the war progressed).This made operational sense and the MI9y coding sub section and American equivalent invented numerous fictional characters such as aunts, uncles, girlfriends, old school mates etc who wrote to prisoners out of the blue, sometimes in chatty familiar terms but always with the catch-date at the top to warn the prisoner that the letter was in code. (More on this and how the letters home were filtered and decoded in later posts).

 

The CIO would not have known the intricacies of the codes themselves, unless he himself was a code user. It is highly likely that he would have known the identity of POW’s who sent out and received the coded letters or at least the hut which housed them. The CIO (unless he delegated the task) would filter intelligence information through the letter code writers and ensure procedures were in place so they were able to work without discovery or interruption by the other prisoners. Privacy and security whilst this work was carried out remained vital and the CIO would have certainly tapped in to X’s camp ‘early warning systems’ already in place for escape work.

 

Sources

 

MI9 Escape and Evasion - M.R.D. Foot & J.M. Langley

National Archives

The Escape Factory - Lloyd R. Shoemaker

The Great Escape - Paul Brickhill

 

©Keith Morley

 

THIS BLOG claims no credit for any images posted on this site unless otherwise noted. Images on this blog are copyright to its respectful owners. If there is an image appearing on this blog that belongs to you and do not wish for it appear on this site, please message me with a link to said image and it will be promptly removed.